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Introduction 
 
 
Collateral Damage from ECB Strategy 
Ultra-loose Monetary Policy Has Little Benefit – and Harms Many 
Heribert Dieter 
2015 will be a defining year for the European Central Bank. It is expected to start buying 
up government bonds from member states from the end of January. This means the 
ECB is entering into significant risk and becoming dependent on the fiscal policy of 
the member states. As the example of Greece demonstrates, the central bank is thus 
making itself – along with other state creditors – vulnerable to blackmail. Governments 
can threaten to stop servicing their debt, forcing the ECB to continue financing them. 
Furthermore, the reasoning for starting to finance member states is spurious. The sup-
posed risks of deflation are actually small: while the prices of apples and heating oil 
have fallen, those of machine tools and consumer durables have not. At the same time, 
it is becoming increasingly apparent that the depreciation of the euro brought about 
by the loose monetary policy harbours huge disadvantages for many of Europe’s trade 
partners – from Switzerland to the US. 
 
The ECB has announced its change in policy 
to great fanfare – due to the great risk of 
deflation it has to buy up government bonds. 
The ECB plans to purchase government 
bonds with a volume of up to one trillion 
euros, starting from the end of January 
2015. The key questions here are: Is there 
really a risk of deflation? How would the 
purchase of government bonds on the sec-
ondary market change this? And has the 
ECB taken the right measures up to now in 
order to stabilise Europe’s financial markets? 
The wrong diagnosis 
Even the ECB’s recent analyses are uncon-
vincing. While it is true that prices are 
declining in some member states of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU), this is 
far from a harmful development. Within 
a monetary union there is no option to 
increase the competitiveness of companies 
(in Greece, to give a concrete example) by 
devaluing the currency. The only way of 
doing this is to reduce prices, and that is 
precisely what is happening at the moment. 
Greek companies have no other alternative 
if they want to make their goods and ser-
vices more economically attractive. 
However, Greece is a special case within 
the eurozone. Prices in Greece fell by 2.3 per-
cent in 2013 and 2.2 percent in 2014, while 
in Germany they increased by 2.1 and 
2.2 percent respectively. Prices in the other 
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crisis nations were stable in 2013 and 2014. 
In Spain, for instance, they have remained 
almost unchanged since 2009. So adjust-
ments in the eurozone are taking effect, 
although very slowly. 
For the eurozone as a whole there is no 
need to leap into action. The 0.2 percent 
decline in consumer prices in December 
2014 compared to the previous month was 
almost entirely due to the sharp fall in the 
prices of energy and some agricultural 
products. Unprocessed agricultural prod-
ucts became 1.0 percent cheaper, while 
energy prices fell by as much as 6.3 per-
cent. Discounting these product groups, 
the prices of which are always subject to 
large fluctuations, prices in the eurozone 
increased by 0.8 percent compared to 
December 2013. 
Moreover, the ECB should think through 
the consequences of its own policies more 
carefully. It is trying to simultaneously reach 
two mutually exclusive goals. On the one 
hand, it wants banks to reduce their risks 
in order to become more resistant to future 
crises. This is certainly a sensible undertak-
ing. It involves the banks strengthening 
their equity base and exiting from particu-
larly high-risk investments. On the other 
hand, the ECB wants the banks to grant 
more credit. But the financial sector is hesi-
tant – and therefore attracting criticism 
from the ECB. 
Deflation for oil, not for machines 
What we are seeing is definitely not across-
the-board deflation, but falling prices of 
certain goods – apples and heating oil, for 
example, but not other product groups. 
This is crucial in terms of assessing the risk, 
as a dangerous level of deflation is only 
present if consumers and investors believe 
that they will be able to make cheaper pur-
chases at a later date. This is clearly not the 
case: consumers are not putting off major 
purchases and car drivers are not waiting 
to fill up their tanks. Investors are cautious, 
but not because they believe they will be 
able to purchase machinery more cheaply 
in the future. Concerns over serious defla-
tion also appear overstated because trade 
unions today – unlike in the 1930s – are 
able to prevent wages being cut. 
Furthermore, inflation expectations have 
certainly not declined. The financial mar-
kets are anticipating an inflation rate of 
1.6 percent in five years. Certainly, oil and 
other commodities will ensure that overall 
price levels decrease again in 2015. But 
from 2016, when the effects of cheaper oil 
have been priced in, inflation rates can be 
expected to rise significantly. 
In the past the central banks have ac-
corded no great importance to large fluc-
tuations in the prices of commodities and 
agricultural products, and this is sensible 
policy. It would have been absurd to place 
additional burden on the economy by tight-
ening monetary policy when oil prices were 
on the rise. Today, when the reverse is true, 
it would be fitting to show the same level of 
composure. The ECB should simply ignore 
the drop in energy prices – a drop that con-
siderably benefits Europe’s economy. 
Upon close inspection there is nothing 
new or surprising about the way that com-
modity and agricultural product prices 
have developed. Russia’s sanctions against 
agricultural imports from the EU – a reac-
tion to previous punitive measures from 
the European side – have led to a surplus 
in supply that is weighing heavily on prices. 
The situation of the oil markets is not dis-
similar. There is currently a huge surplus 
in supply and oil is being traded on the 
spot markets at the lowest prices seen in 
a long time. In six months the price has 
fallen from over 110 dollars to under 50 
dollars per barrel. 
From a historical perspective, however, 
oil remains expensive. In 1999 crude oil 
cost around ten dollars a barrel. The very 
high price levels we have seen in recent 
years made investments in new, unconven-
tional sources attractive. This increased the 
supply, leading to lower prices. The same 
applies to many other commodities, from 
iron ore to coal and copper, where prices 
are falling across the board. This refutes the 
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long-held theory that this time everything 
is different and commodity prices will now 
permanently remain at a high level. 
This is painful for countries such as 
Venezuela and Russia, which are depen-
dent on high oil prices. A look at recent 
economic history reveals the extent of this 
dependence. In 1999 Russian GDP stood at 
195 billion dollars and 1,300 dollars per 
capita. In 2013 Russian GDP amounted to 
2.1 trillion dollars, a more than 10-fold 
increase, and the per-capita growth was 
equally rapid, rising to 14,600 dollars by 
2013. With the combination of significantly 
lower oil prices and a strong decline in the 
exchange rate, the Russian central bank 
certainly does have a problem. But why is 
the ECB creating one for itself? 
The silent introduction of a 
liability union 
So if, upon closer inspection, price trends 
cannot be regarded as a sufficient motive 
for purchasing government bonds, the 
question arises as to what goal the ECB is 
pursuing with this measure. A fact is that 
the ECB is moving into uncharted territory 
here. Faced with the possibility of default 
in Greece – more likely since the victory of 
the Syriza movement led by Alexis Tsipras 
in the election on 25 January – it seems 
sensible to consider the risk of further 
countries defaulting on debt. 
Up to now the ECB has prevented any 
chance of default by participating in the 
rescue measures for Greece. In doing so 
it has single-handedly – and without corre-
sponding legal protection – declared itself 
a preferred creditor. The ECB is therefore 
claiming a status that the International 
Monetary Fund has enjoyed for decades. 
Debts to the IMF are always serviced. Even 
Argentina paid back its debts to the IMF 
in full – even though Nestor Kirchner’s gov-
ernment had to borrow from Venezuela, 
then led by Hugo Chavez, to do so. 
Yet what method would be employed if 
one of ECB’s major borrowers, Italy for in-
stance, stopped servicing its debts? Such a 
scenario may seem utopian to some, but 
calls for Italy to exit the eurozone can 
already be heard today from two major 
political groups – Lega Nord and the Five 
Star Movement. Since the ECB intends to 
expand its balance sheet by more than one 
trillion euros, by purchasing government 
bonds of the same volume, the sums at stake 
are enormous. 
If a country such as Italy were to become 
the main beneficiary of the bond purchas-
ing programme, the ECB and its sharehold-
ers could be faced with a huge default risk. 
Suppose the ECB buys Italian bonds with a 
value of 500 billion euros on the secondary 
market; this would be a gamble for EMU 
members. Germany would be shouldering 
a risk of around 140 billion euros. 
Is this kind of scepticism appropriate? 
Looking at the history of European rescue 
policy, doubts over the supposedly risk-free 
nature of the ECB programme are justified. 
When the IMF, the ECB, the European Sta-
bility Mechanism (ESM) and bilateral donors 
took over previously private debts in 2011, 
liability risks for the public sector were 
categorically ruled out. This proved to be 
a false assertion. The public creditors are 
already having to subsidise Greece today. 
The country pays an average interest rate 
of 2.4 percent on public debt – lower than 
the top performer Germany, which has 
to cough up 2.7 percent on average. That 
means the remaining eurozone states, 
including some considerably poorer than 
Greece, are subsidising Greek society. 
This makes the results questionable 
enough already, but the bill may be about 
to grow even bigger. Greek politicians and 
some German economists, such as Marcel 
Fratzscher, head of the German Institute 
for Economic Research (DIW), and Henrik 
Enderlein from the Hertie School of Gov-
ernance, are now calling for another debt 
cut for Greece. This would entail a burden 
of 50 billion euros – for Germany alone. 
Interesting here is how the ECB justifies 
the purchase of government bonds on the 
secondary market. Rapidly increasing risk 
premiums for government bonds of EMU 
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member states has led to a “critical finan-
cial situation,” the ECB explains, adding 
that under these circumstances it must 
ensure that it can properly carry out its 
monetary policy mandate – hence the pur-
chase of government bonds. 
Leaving aside the fact that the ECB and 
its President Mario Draghi want to cancel 
out market reactions, the question arises as 
to what “critical financial situation” we are 
currently facing. The interest rates on gov-
ernment bonds of European debtors are 
at record low levels. There is absolutely no 
reason to correct temporary overreactions 
of the markets. The purported goal of having 
interest rates on government bonds return 
to normal levels has been reached even 
without a bond purchasing programme. So 
what purpose does it serve for the central 
bank to now begin indirectly financing 
EMU member countries? 
One often overlooked factor is that the 
prohibition of directly financing member 
states, as per Article 123 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, 
does not necessarily mean that purchasing 
government bonds on the secondary mar-
ket is permitted. According to Council 
Regulation 3603/1993, purchasing debt 
instruments on the secondary market is 
also prohibited. This detail was also ignored 
by the Advocate General at the European 
Court of Justice when he formulated his 
Opinion of 14 January 2015 on the decision 
to purchase government bonds. 
So what lies behind the ECB’s plans? It 
seems that the central bank is desperate to 
find a justification for its reckless venture. 
Since the interest rates have fallen so sharp-
ly – though without stimulating growth – 
the ECB is now, as previously mentioned, 
invoking the spectre of deflation. Mean-
while, the numerous side effects of Draghi’s 
medicine are being ignored. 
The most significant side effect is that 
it will give the crisis-ridden countries, par-
ticularly Italy, a false sense of security. 
Despite faltering reforms, a lack of growth 
and declining industrial production in the 
country, the risk premiums for a country 
like Italy will not rise. Thanks to the ECB, 
they will continue to fall. The question is, 
how much longer do national economies 
such as Italy or France need to implement 
reforms? And what will the ECB do if 
changes do not materialise, despite having 
bought more time for adjustments? What 
is its exit scenario in this case? 
Yet the side effects do not end there. 
By purchasing government bonds, the ECB 
forces private investors to opt for other 
assets, often carrying higher risks. This adds 
to the danger of price bubbles in markets 
such as real estate or equities. The ECB does 
not recognise this risk. It assumes that 
monetary policy can influence economic 
development, even in the crisis that has 
been ongoing since 2008. 
The Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) holds a decidedly different position 
on the matter. It stresses that we are experi-
encing what is known as a balance sheet 
recession. Unlike during a conventional 
phase of economic weakness, banks in this 
situation focus on improving the quality 
of their balance sheets. This diminishes the 
direct impact of interest rate cuts by the 
central banks, but not of the side effects. 
The liquidity flows into risky assets, with 
the emerging markets currently receiving 
the lion’s share. Should they start experi-
encing turbulence, the negative effects will 
be felt in the OECD countries as well. 
In January 2015, the possibility of Greece 
exiting the eurozone set off alarm bells, 
as it is generally believed this would harm 
both the country itself and the eurozone. 
Greece, the German economist Enderlein 
says, would then have great difficulty in 
getting back on a path of growth. The Greek 
people’s savings would be wiped out; the 
entire eurozone would be hit by serious 
turbulence. But should an exit by Greece or 
another EMU member really be viewed so 
negatively? Or could Greece even benefit if 
it introduced an undervalued currency? 
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The case of Argentina 
It is well known from development eco-
nomics that national economies with an 
overvalued exchange rate often have con-
siderable difficulty generating growth. 
The other side of this equation is that an 
undervalued currency has positive effects 
on economic development. From Greece’s 
point of view, its own currency, the euro,  
has a high value. The country’s firms are 
finding it tough to compete, both on the 
global market and domestically. This is 
why, as previously mentioned, they are 
making the painful adjustment of cutting 
prices. 
A new currency would solve this prob-
lem. There are numerous examples in eco-
nomic history of how devaluation can have 
a beneficial effect. Argentina’s situation 
around the turn of the millennium is a dra-
matic case in point. For a long time the 
Argentinians had clung to an exchange rate 
regime that was even anchored in the con-
stitution. Like in Greece a decade later, the 
IMF used a number of loans to maintain 
the illusion that Argentina could retain the 
exchange rate of 1:1 to the dollar. And, as 
in Greece today, the consequences of the 
overvaluation were dramatic. The economy 
stagnated, unemployment was high, and 
finally the IMF, led by Horst Köhler, recog-
nised that there was no hope for its policy. 
In 2001 the fund denied Argentina new 
loans, the house of cards came tumbling 
down and Argentina entered a turbulent 
period. 
However, this phase only lasted for a few 
months. Thanks to the peso’s devaluation 
to around a quarter of its previous value, a 
small Argentinian economic miracle began 
to take shape. From 1999 to 2001 national 
GDP had declined by an average of 2.7 per-
cent per year, before plummeting 11 percent 
in 2002. But from 2003 to 2007 the econo-
my grew by 8.6 percent per year. An inter-
esting point here is that Argentina, con-
trary to the expectations of many observers, 
was inundated with capital inflows after 
the devaluation and the default. Argentini-
ans who had invested their capital abroad 
during the years of overvaluation brought 
back their money after 2002 and invested 
it at home. 
Debt cut for Greece? 
A similar development could be expected in 
Greece. It is misguided to believe that many 
Greek savers would suffer if the country re-
introduced its own currency. In fact, a large 
number of wealthy Greeks already shifted 
their capital abroad some time ago. It is 
estimated that over 280 billion euros of 
Greek money has been deposited in Switzer-
land alone. Naturally it is impossible to give 
precise figures here, as we are talking about 
money that has been hidden from the tax 
authorities. But it seems plausible to assume 
that the Greek capital stockpiled abroad 
amounts to a considerable volume. Further-
more, in recent years the country’s citizens 
have significantly increased their cash re-
serves. In other words, most of the money is 
protected from devaluation, whether it is in 
Switzerland or underneath the mattress at 
home. 
Moreover, it would be dangerous to make 
further concessions to Greece. The country 
is already paying a smaller proportion of 
GDP for interest payments on public debt 
than other, less indebted countries. While 
Greece spent just 4.2 percent of GDP on 
interest in 2014, Italy and Portugal had 
to pay 4.5 and 4.6 percent respectively on 
interest on their sovereign debt – although 
their debt levels are considerably lower. 
Particularly in Portugal, which has had to 
endure a tough austerity programme just 
like Greece, further preferential treatment 
of Greece could be viewed as unfair. In other 
countries too, where the standard of living 
is lower than in Greece, a sense of irritation 
over the continued funding of Greece is 
growing. These nations include Slovakia, 
Slovenia and the Baltic states. 
Although loud protests can be heard 
from Greece about the lower standard of 
living, upon closer inspection this proves 
to be an exaggeration. Certainly, per-capita 
GDP has fallen by 25 percent since the start 
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of the crisis. However, Greek incomes also 
rose by 36 percent in the first years of its 
EMU membership – that is three times the 
average increase of EMU members. Today 
average incomes in Greece are still 8 per-
cent higher than they were before the intro-
duction of the euro. 
There were also calls for a generous debt 
cancellation during previous crises. In 1999 
Russia demanded a restructuring of its debts 
to its public creditors organised in the Paris 
Club. Then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
and his Finance Minister Mikhail Kasyanov 
wanted to force Germany and the other 
creditors to forego 50 percent of the out-
standing debt. In Germany’s case this was 
the considerable sum of 10 billion dollars. 
The federal government at the time refused, 
and when crude oil prices rose Russia was 
able to repay its loans to its public lenders 
without any problems. 
There are believed to be notable oil 
reserves in Greece too. In 2014 test drilling 
has begun to explore these reserves. Athens 
is hoping for additional revenue of between 
375 and 600 billion euros over the next 15 
to 20 years. Foreign Minister and PASOK 
President Evangelos Venizelos plans to use 
this money to boost the pension and health 
insurance funds. From the perspective of 
the country’s creditors, however, the proper 
thing to do would be to first pay off Greece’s 
debts to the European taxpayers. 
The unforeseeable consequences of 
the liquidity glut 
The case of Greece very clearly shows the 
risks associated with disproportionate 
lending. Yet the ECB continues to pursue 
a policy that seeks to solve economic prob-
lems by flooding the markets with liquidity. 
After over five years of ultra-loose monetary 
policy, the question arises as to why this 
approach is not actually bringing the desired 
results. 
The IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office 
(IEO) recently examined this issue and came 
to some very noteworthy and plausible con-
clusions. The loose monetary policy was 
bound to fail from the outset, the IEO says, 
because private households and companies 
use this situation primarily to reduce their 
debts (deleveraging). It is therefore not pos-
sible to boost demand with cheap capital. 
The analysis of the Bank for International 
Settlements is almost identical. After a 
serious financial crisis, BIS Chief Economist 
Hyun Song Shin says, monetary policy has 
less of an influence. Investors in the real 
economy are unsettled and therefore delay 
investments, he explains, while monetary 
policy mostly influences the financial mar-
kets, and there its effects are negative. 
The IEO goes on to say that the generous 
monetary policy of the major central banks, 
including the ECB, has negatively impacted 
developing and emerging countries because 
debtors there have engaged in highly specu-
lative carry trades: they have borrowed 
money in Europe and the US to invest in 
emerging economies. What they chose to 
ignore was the exchange rate risk. If mone-
tary policy were to normalise, which would 
mean interest rates in countries such as the 
US significantly rising, the major curren-
cies would be expected to increase in value. 
Debtors from developing and emerging 
economies could then quickly run into 
troubled waters since they have to service 
their debt in dollars, but are generating 
returns in their domestic currency. There 
are considerable sums at stake here. Debtors 
from developing and emerging countries 
have issued bonds with a volume of 2.6 tril-
lion dollars, three quarters of which are 
denominated in dollars. 
The ultra-loose monetary policy has 
therefore not achieved its goal of stimu-
lating the domestic economy, but it has 
brought about significant side effects. BIS 
Chief Economist Shin calls this monetary 
policy – in the cautious language of central 
banking circles – “somewhat problematic”. 
The BIS fears that the ultra-loose monetary 
policy is creating risks in the financial sys-
tem that can no longer be controlled by 
the banking supervisors. In Shin’s view, the 
central banks should tighten monetary 
policy without delay. 
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Both the Federal Reserve and the ECB 
have pushed investors into higher-risk 
assets with their policy of prolonged low 
interest rates, probably at the expense of 
financial market stability in the US and 
Europe. Most of all, the liquidity glut has 
increased the risks to financial stability in 
the emerging nations. The sharp rise in 
their debt levels has been a key factor in 
the growth of the overall indebtedness of 
all states, private households and com-
panies (excluding the financial sector) 
from 174 percent of global GDP in 2008 
to 212 percent in 2013. The escalation was 
especially dramatic in China, where debt 
grew from 145 to 217 percent of GDP. 
China’s rising debt, in particular, is not 
sustainable. The country’s economic growth 
in recent years has been financed with cred-
it, and coupled with the Chinese property 
bubble the country’s situation is reminis-
cent of that of the US or Spain before the 
outbreak of their financial crises. 
Is the ECB cooperating with the Fed? 
In 2015 the Federal Reserve is likely to take 
the step it has previously indicated and raise 
interest rates. Anticipation of this move on 
the financial markets is already causing the 
euro to fall against the dollar. But does it 
make sense for the ECB to allow the cur-
rency to be undervalued? Whom does this 
policy benefit, and whom does it harm? 
We know from previous periods when 
there was a clear gap between US and Euro-
pean interest rates that the exchange rate 
of the dollar can temporarily overshoot. In 
the early 1980s Paul Volcker, then Chair-
man of the Fed, opted for a very restrictive 
monetary policy in order to combat high 
rates of inflation. The Bundesbank and 
other European central banks did not fol-
low the US policy of high interest rates – 
which led to the value of the dollar against 
the German mark doubling between 1980 
and 1985. At the peak of this trend one 
dollar cost 3.47 German marks. 
That came as a welcome boost to Euro-
pean companies, but for their American 
competitors it was fatal. In that period the 
deindustrialisation of the US accelerated. 
Moving factories abroad was extremely 
lucrative, not least because of the expensive 
dollar. But would today’s US government 
tolerate another period with an overvalued 
dollar? It is true that the US has returned to 
a path of growth. The OECD is forecasting 
real growth of 3.1 percent in 2015, follow-
ing 2.2 percent in 2014. However, the re-
industrialisation of the USA that has been 
observed in recent years would be put at 
risk by a sharp rise in the value of the dol-
lar. The Fed will not allow this to happen. 
This has triggered concerns that the risks 
to financial stability will continue to grow. 
Cheap money will encourage price bubbles 
on both property and stock markets. There 
are numerous examples in economic his-
tory of the negative effects of a monetary 
policy that ignores the risks that stem from 
sharply increasing asset prices. Japan pro-
vides a particularly drastic example. In the 
late 1980s it allowed a double asset price 
bubble to form – in equities and real estate 
– and the country is still battling the con-
sequences of this misguided monetary 
policy 25 years after the bubbles burst. 
The ECB must know what is at stake for 
the US. Recognising that property and stock 
markets are booming in certain European 
countries, the ECB should cooperate with 
the Fed in increasing interest rates over the 
course of 2015 in order to prevent dramatic 
consequences for the dollar/euro exchange 
rate. 
Of course this would attract heavy criti-
cism. In Southern Europe there would prob-
ably be very loud complaints about this kind 
of policy reversal by the ECB. But we must 
consider what would happen if the ECB 
were to accept a significant weakening of 
the euro. This would be a major hindrance 
to Europe’s future economic cooperation 
with the US. Europe would be valuing 
short-term political and economic goals 
more highly than long-term cooperation 
with the US. While the Europeans are cur-
rently negotiating with Washington over 
a comprehensive trade partnership, they 
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would be placing great monetary policy 
burdens on the Americans. In other words, 
the strengthening of cooperation in the 
TTIP free-trade area would be counteracted 
by new tensions in the area of currency. 
If the ECB is hoping to increase inflation 
in the eurozone by devaluing the euro, this 
is a risky game to play. Firstly, it is difficult 
to control what is known as imported infla-
tion. Secondly, both the US and the rest 
of the world would have to be prepared to 
tolerate a European devaluation strategy. 
Should China and other emerging econo-
mies not do so, there would be a risk of 
entering into a currency devaluation race 
that harms everyone, like in the 1930s. 
The ECB is changing Europe 
The further loosening of ECB policy is 
changing Europe without there having 
been a serious debate about whether this 
is desired. Criticism voiced primarily by 
the Bundesbank and German observers has 
gone virtually unheard. The majority in the 
ECB’s Governing Council is supporting the 
further loosening of monetary policy and 
views the associated risks as small. Yet this 
nonchalant attitude is unconvincing. After 
the costly and still ongoing Greek rescue 
operation Europe is stumbling on towards 
new risks. The ECB is becoming dependent 
on the fiscal policy of its debtors – and now 
has hardly any influence on the implemen-
tation of reforms. Other European societies 
are being made liable, yet there is no way 
for the Finns, for example, to influence 
Italian fiscal policy. 
Over 20 years after the signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty, a core element of this 
agreement is being turned on its head. The 
Maastricht criteria on new and total debts 
were meant to protect well-managed econo-
mies from the risk of contagion from states 
with frivolous fiscal policies. Today not only 
is such contagion possible, but ECB policy 
is actually mutualising debts. The central 
bank is entering into great risks and those 
negatively affected can do nothing to defend 
themselves. The German government should 
remind the ECB of one thing above all: 
a devaluation race with the US is not in 
Europe’s interest, and therefore coordi-
nating Europe’s monetary policy in 2015 
with that of the Fed is more important 
than once again cutting the financing 
costs of Southern European crisis nations. 
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